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Prologue 
 
The thesis I will defend here comprises two propositions: Firstly, quantum 
mechanics is not a physical theory that happens to make use of probability calculus; it 
is itself a generalised form of probability calculus, doubled by a procedure of 
evaluation that is probabilistic by way of its controlled usage of symmetries. 
Secondly, quantum mechanics does not have merely a predictive function like other 
physical theories; it consists in a formalisation of the conditions of possibility of any 
prediction bearing upon phenomena whose circumstances of detection are also 
conditions of production. 
 
Probabilities, Signs, and Secondary Qualities 
 
Before developing and justifying the above propositions, I should like to 
return briefly to the prehistory of probability calculus, between the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. This return will help us in overcoming certain prejudices about 
probability that are the product of an intermediate era (roughly, the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries), and in approaching quantum mechanics with an open mind. I 
mean in particular the prejudice that consists in conceiving probability merely as the 
expression of a certain subjective ignorance of underlying processes, processes which 
play out in and of themselves, according to determinist laws. 
So what conditions permitted the collective elaboration, from the seventeenth 
century onward,1 of probability calculus? Ian Hacking has furnished an extensive list 
of such conditions,2 but he insists upon one in particular. This crucial condition is the 
development, in the sixteenth century, of sciences of signs or of secondary qualities. 
The distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities—in other 
words, between properties that show themselves such as they are intrinsically, and 
properties imputed to material bodies on the basis of impressions or signs that result 
from their interactions with the sense organs—is usually attributed to Locke. It can 
ultimately be traced to Galileo, Descartes and Robert Boyle. But in fact we already 
find the trace of it earlier, in Jerome Francastor, a doctor in the first half of the 
sixteenth century. 
From the moment when the distinction was recognised, an opposition could 
develop between the sciences of first causes and exact proofs (such as astronomy, 
geometry, and mechanics), and the other sciences (such as medicine and chemistry) 
which were reduced to prognostics acting on the basis of signs, phenomena, or 
sensible secondary qualities. It is in the field of so-called ‘inferior’ sciences, these 
sciences of secondary qualities, that the notion would crystallise of an opinion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  precursor	  is	  Jerome	  Cardan,	  in	  the	  mid	  sixteenth	  century.	  But	  his	  work	  remained	  isolated,	  with	  no	  real	  influence,	  and	  his	  main	  treatise	  on	  games	  of	  chance	  was	  only	  printed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1663,	  in	  the	  era	  of	  Pascal	  and	  Huyghens.	  2	  I.	  Hacking,	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Probability	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1975).	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supported by signs, which in part gave rise to the concept of probability. The clues as 
to the outbreak of an epidemic, or the symptoms of an illness, which are secondary in 
relation to the supposed primary causes of the epidemic or the illness, were, for 
example, called ‘signs of probability’ by Francastor in his book On Contagion.3 
This close association between the birth of the concept of probability and the 
elaboration of the concept of secondary qualities bears an implicit lesson for the 
understanding of the privileged link between quantum mechanics and probability. 
For, as Heisenberg wrote, quantum physics confronts a situation where even spatio-
cinematic variables of the position and quantity of movement, which were considered 
at the time of Descartes and Locke as direct and ‘primary’, must be taken as indirect 
manifestations, relative to an instrumental context—in short, as secondary.4 To the 
universalization of the notion of secondary quality, or of the relativity of phenomena 
in regard to a context, responds, in quantum mechanics, the universalization of the 
pertinent domain of probability. 
One can guess, however, from this short summary, the reason why the concept 
of probability remained embryonic and marginal in the natural science of the first half 
of the seventeenth century; a reason which also explains, albeit belatedly, the 
contemporary reticence to take entirely seriously a physical theory built on a 
probabilistic armature, such as quantum mechanics. This reason is that, from the 
beginning, probabilities were considered as a predictive lesser evil in a situation 
where one finds oneself momentarily incapable of offering an descriptive account 
based upon well-founded principles and truths (truths concerning efficient causes if 
one is Aristotelian, figures and movements if one is Cartesian). It is no surprise, under 
these conditions, that all the efforts of the players in the first scientific revolution were 
focused on elucidating causal links or describing a real universe of primary qualities 
by way of geometry, rather than seeking to systematise the estimation of the uncertain 
in the shifting circumscription of secondary qualities. 
 
The Uncertain and the Middle of Things 
 
As Catherine Chevalley quite rightly emphasises, 5  the estimation of the 
uncertain only began to constitute an entirely separate theme of investigation in the 
work of an anticartesian thinker, Pascal, for whom ‘the end of things and their 
beginning are hopelessly hidden from [man] in an impenetrable secret’.6 If man must 
content himself, according to Pascal, with ‘perceiving the appearance of the middle of 
things, in an eternal despair of knowing either their beginning or their end’7, he 
cannot content himself with denigrating the appearances in favour of an ungraspable 
backworld governed by principles. Man must learn to inhabit his milieu; he must 
know how to focus his attention upon the play of his experimental manipulations and 
the phenomena that result from them; he must admit the inconsistency of cutting up 
the world into separate and intrinsically-existing objects, since phenomena are so tied 
one to another that it is impossible to know how to grasp one without grasping all; he 
must understand, also, that no cognition can free itself from the nexus of 
interrelations, but can only situate itself within it, remaining cognisant of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.,	  28.	  4	  W.	   Heisenberg,	   Philosophical	   Problems	   of	   Quantum	   Physics	   (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Oxbow	   Press,	  1979),	  38. 5	  C.	  Chevalley,	  Pascal,	  contingence	  et	  probabilities	  (Paris:	  PUF,	  1995).	  6	  B.	  Pascal,	  Pensées,	  fragment	  199,	  in	  Oeuvres	  complètes	  (Paris:	  Seuil,	  1963),	  526.	  7	  Ibid.	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perspective from which it derives. Finally, man must consent to make the effort to 
domesticate the uncertainty that is his lot, by mathematizing directly the relations 
between antecedents and expectations, and between expectations and observations. 
Of course, probability calculus was able to develop after Pascal by freeing 
itself of what some would call an epistemological pessimism motivated by the vertigo 
of the impenetrability of the Divine plan. The tone, in Laplace’s 1814 Philosophical 
Essay on Probabilities, is almost antipodeal to the latter, since Laplace here affirms 
the all-powerfulness of a Principle of Sufficient Reason incarnated by a God whose 
work is transparent. According to Laplace, ‘the curve described by a simple molecule 
of air or of vapour is governed in a manner just as certain as that of planetary orbits: 
the only difference between them is that which our ignorance places there.’8 And it is 
only in this interval between the in-principle determination of all things and our 
perhaps provisional ignorance with regard to them, that probability has any place: 
‘probability’, Laplace continues, ‘is relative in part to our ignorance, and in part to our 
cognitions’.9 
Such a conception perfectly fulfilled its office in the framework of classical 
physics, and particularly in classical statistical mechanics (leaving to one side the 
more recent problematic of sensitivity to initial conditions). But, faced with the 
recurrent question of the essential or nonessential character of probabilities in 
quantum physics, and the difficulties it presents to the thesis of probability-ignorance, 
it was worthwhile our returning to Laplace, and recalling that the calculus of 
probabilities made one of its first appearances upon an entirely other philosophical 
terrain. It emerged in Pascal, as we saw, on the basis of a recognition of 
anthropological limits, of an epistemology close to operationalism, of a generalised 
holism, and of a gnoseological perspectivism. One cannot but be struck in observing 
that all these traits are present in the most current interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, and that there is no acceptable interpretation that does not include at least 
one of them. The most frequently encountered trait, including in the most reliable 
‘hidden variable’ interpretation, is holism. 
 
Indeterminism and Contextuality 
 
These two historical remarks—one on the association of the concept of 
probability with the concept of secondary qualities, the other on the conception of 
probability calculus as an instrument for the predictive mastery of our situation of 
entanglement in the network of natural relations—will now help us to undo two 
interpretative knots of quantum physics, both of which relate to indeterminism. 
The first concerns the notion, very widespread since Heisenberg’s 
foundational works of 1927-30, of an uncontrollable perturbation that the agent of 
measurement is supposed to exert upon the microscopic measured object. It is 
interesting to note that this ‘perturbation’ was assigned a twofold role by those who 
conceived of it. 
On one hand, as Bohr emphasises at the end of the 1920s, the uncontrollable 
perturbation constitutes the reason for the indivisibility of quantum phenomena—that 
is to say, the impossibility of separating in the phenomena that which belongs to the 
object and that which belongs to the measuring agent. Perturbation would explain, in 
other words (borrowed this time from Heisenberg), that quantum physics leads to a 
generalisation of the model of secondary qualities—with their obligatory reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  P.	  S.	  de	  Laplace,	  Essai	  philosophique	  sur	  les	  probabilités	  (Paris:	  Courcier,	  1814),	  4.	  9	  Ibid.	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the context within which they manifest themselves—to the detriment of that of 
primary intrinsic qualities. 
But on the other hand, according to the 1927 article where Heisenberg 
presents his so-called ‘uncertainty’ relations for the first time, the perturbation is also 
that which takes account of the indeterminism of quantum physics. The 
incompressible and uncontrollable perturbation by the agent of measurement is what 
prevents complete knowledge of the two groups of variables that compose the initial 
state of a particle. Consequently, concludes Heisenberg, the principle of causality, 
which links in a constraining fashion an initial state and a final state, is inapplicable in 
quantum physics. 
The model of ‘perturbation’ thus allows us to bring to light a close relation 
between contextuality and indeterminism, since perturbation has as a consequence the 
contextuality of phenomena as well as an indeterminism in regard to them. A relation 
which is, perhaps, historically translated in the confluence of the concepts of 
secondary quality and probability at the time of their birth. Unfortunately, the image 
of the perturbation of the object by the measuring agent also has a major 
inconvenience which did not escape Bohr or Heisenberg, and which Karl Popper later 
emphasised: Basically, this image begins by bringing into play a universe of objects 
endowed with primary spatial and kinematic qualities, and then invoking their mutual 
alteration so as to subsequently justify the putting aside of the concept of primary 
quality and the generalisation of that of secondary quality.10 In this image, then, one 
puts forward the representation of a universe of figures and movements, with the 
unique aim of demonstrating its inanity, or (what comes down to the same thing, for a 
verificationist epistemology) its in-principle inaccessibility. 
The image of ‘perturbation’ thus represents a metastable moment in the 
reflection on quantum mechanics. It invites us to surpass it, in two opposite 
directions: Either we take wholly seriously the premises, and we try to construct an 
empirically-adequate theory of the inaccessible spatio-kinematic processes that are 
postulated—this is the strategy of the authors of certain hidden variable theories. Or, 
on the contrary, we take wholly seriously the holistic consequences of the image of 
perturbation, namely the indivisibility of the quantum phenomena, its unsurpassable 
relativity to an experimental context, and we develop a conception of physical theory 
that no longer appeals to an imagined representation of the supposedly constitutive 
moments of the phenomena—this is the strategy that Bohr adopted from 1935 
onward, not without certain shortcomings. 
It is reassuring for those who, like myself, have chosen to push the second 
strategy to its ultimate consequences, to observe that it is possible to establish a direct 
formal link between indeterminism and contextuality, without need of an intermediary 
furnished by the image of perturbation. In 1935, Grete Harmann published a small 
book in which she hinted at such a link.11 This young German philosopher remarked 
that the possible causes of a quantum phenomena cannot be used to foresee it, 
because they are only ever defined afterwards, relatively to the very circumstances of 
the production of this phenomena when measured. Later, at the beginning of the 
1950s, Paulette Destouches-Fevrier proved in a much more rigorous way a theorem 
according to which every predictive theory bearing upon phenomena defined relative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  On	   this	   point,	   see	   M.	   Bitbol,	  Mécanique	   quantique,	   une	   introduction	   philosophique	   (Paris:	   Flammarion,	  1996),	  Chapter	  3.	  11	  G.	  Hermann,	  Les	  fondements	  philosophiques	  de	  la	  mécanique	  quantique,	   tr.	  A.	  Schnell	  and	  L.	  Soler	   (Paris:	  Vrin,	  1996),	  90.	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to experimental contexts certain of which are mutually incompatible, is ‘essentially 
indeterminist’.12 
 
Determinist Ideals, Indeterminist Projections 
 
Let us remark now that, through what has been said above, a second 
interpretative knot concerning the relation between quantum physics and 
indeterminism has been implicitly undone. It was often asked in the 1930s whether 
quantum mechanics, with its probabilistic, or even ‘statistical’ (as Einstein had it) 
character might one day be rendered obsolete by a determinist theory of the individual 
underlying processes. The response of the last forty years research to this question is 
somewhat sibylline, but all the more instructive philosophically. 
The first lesson to be drawn from this research is that it is not possible to 
formulate theories which dictate the intrinsic properties of individual objects via 
determinist laws, but which also reproduce exactly the predictions of quantum 
mechanics.13 These so-called hidden variable theories simply find themselves subject 
to certain constraints, principal among which are non-locality14 (that is to say, the 
instantaneous mutual influence of the properties of arbitrarily distant objects) and 
contextualism15 (that is to say, the influence of the measuring device on the postulated 
properties). These two conditions, however, do raise problems. The nonlocal concept 
of instantaneous interactions at a distance16 introduces a formal conflict (albeit one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  P.	   Destouches-­‐Février,	   La	   structure	   des	   théories	   physiques	   (Paris:PUF,	   1951),	   260-­‐80.	   This	   theorem	   is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  hidden	  variable	  (or	  rather,	  hidden	  process)	  theories,	  since	  it	  bears	  only	  upon	  the	  link	  between	  effective	  or	  possible	  phenomena,	  and	  not	  the	  link	  between	  processes	  in	  principle	  inaccessible	  to	  experimentation	  (see	  paragraph	  5).	  	  13	  D.	  Bohm	  &	  B.	  Hiley,	  The	  Undivided	  Universe	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993).	  14	  J.	  Bell,	  Speakable	  and	  Unspeakable	  in	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  15 	  S.	   Kochen	   and	   E.	   Specker,	   ‘The	   problem	   of	   hidden	   variables	   in	   quantum	   mechanics’,	   Journal	   of	  
Mathematical	  Mechanics	  17	  (1967),	  59-­‐87.	  16	  At	   this	   stage	  we	  must	  avoid	   confusions	  of	  vocabulary	  and	   ideas	  between	  standard	  quantum	  mechanics	  and	   hidden-­‐variable	   theories,	  which	  may	   lead	   one	   to	   believe	  wrongly	   that	   standard	   quantum	  mechanics	  encounters	   the	   same	  problems	  as	  hidden-­‐variable	   theories	  with	   regard	   to	  nonlocality.	   Standard	  quantum	  mechanics	   leads	  us	   to	   foresee	  correlations	   between	  distant	   experimental	   events;	  but,	   in	   itself,	   it	   furnishes	  
nothing	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  these	  correlations.	  In	  particular,	  it	  does	  not	  imply	  in	  itself	  any	  idea	  of	  nonlocal	  interactions.	  All	  one	  can	  remark	  is	  the	  nonfactorisability	  of	  the	  components	  of	  a	  global	  state	  vector	  which	  furnishes	  (correlated)	  probabilities	  of	  the	  results	  of	  two	  distant	  events.	  But	  the	  current	  interpretation	   of	   the	   state	   vector	   poses	   the	   temptation	   to	   a	   semantic	   overdetermination	   of	  nonfactorisability.	   For	   in	   this	   interpretation,	   a	   state	   vector	   represents	   the	   ‘state’	   of	   a	   ‘system’,	   and	   not	  merely	   a	   generalised	   instrument	   of	   the	   probability	   calculus	   of	   experimental	   phenomena.	   Whence	   the	  nonfactorisability	  of	  the	  state	  vector	  was	  understood	  as	  the	  nonseparability	  of	  the	  states	  of	  the	  subsystems	  that	   composed	   the	   system;	   and	   this	   nonseparability	   was	   sometimes	   confused	   with	   the	   nonlocality	   that	  implies	   instantaneous	   influence.	   The	   difficulties	   and	   confusions	   here	   come	   from	   the	   mixing	   up	   of	   an	  operationalist	  and	  predictive	  orientation	  with	  implicitly	  ontological	  and	  descriptive	  elements	  (the	  concepts	  of	  ‘system’	  and	  ‘state’).	  Hidden-­‐variable	   theories	   have	   at	   least	   the	   advantage	   that	   they	   seek	   to	   furnish	   an	   explicitly	   ontological	  interpretation	  of	  quantum	  mechanics,	  bringing	  in	  the	  intrinsic	  properties	  of	  objects.	  On	  this	  basis,	  they	  can	  claim	   to	   explain	   correlations.	   The	   correlations	   are	   explained	   either	   in	   applying	   the	   concept	   of	   causes	  common	   to	   the	   postulated	   intrinsic	   properties	   (local	   hidden	   variable	   theories),	   or	   by	   invoking	  instantaneous	  interactions	  at	  a	  distance	  between	  these	  properties	  (nonlocal	  hidden	  variable	  theories).	  The	  explanation	  via	  common	  causes	  having	  been	  excluded	  by	  Bell’s	  theorem,	  it	  remains	  to	  partisans	  of	  hidden	  variable	   theories	   to	   confront	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   explanation	   via	   instantaneous	   interactions	   at	   a	  distance.	  Let	  us	  just	  indicate	  that	  an	  attempt	  to	  generalise	  explanation	  via	  causes	  common	  to	  contextual	  phenomena	  rather	  than	  to	  properties,	  without	  soliciting	  any	  structure	  other	  than	  that	  of	  standard	  quantum	  mechanics,	  and	  consequently	  without	  falling	  victim	  to	  Bell’s	  theorem,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  M.	  Bitbol,	  Mécanique	  quantique,	  
une	  introduction	  philosophique	  (Paris:	  Flammarion,	  1996),	  189-­‐91.	  
	   6	  
without practical consequences) with the axioms of relativity theory. 17  As for 
contextualism, it has as a consequence that measurements do not at all allow us to 
accede, point by point, to continuous and determinist processes which, according to 
the theory, would take place in nd of themselves in nature if one had not modified 
them by seeking to bring them to light. In other words, the theory itself implies that 
the ‘independent’ determinist processes that it describes are inaccessible to 
experience. 
The conclusion to draw from this is certainly not that we must cast anathema 
on hidden variable theories, but simply that it is indispensible to revise their ambitions 
downward. We have seen that one of the principal objectives of their advocates was to 
reopen the question of determinism, against those who affirmed overhastily that this 
question had already been settled (in a negative sense) by quantum mechanics. 
Standard quantum mechanics may well have been ‘essentially indeterminist’ in 
structure, but if one could reproduce its results in an other theory comprising 
determinist processes, the determinist option would regain all of its credibility. It is 
true that the ontological question of knowing whether the ultimate laws of nature are 
or are not determinist is undecidable, because determinist appearances can result from 
a statistical regularity, and, inversely, indeterminist appearances can be a translation 
of deterministic chaotic phenomena. 18  But at least one could still hope for 
determinism to rediscover its traditional status as a guiding thread for research. But 
we have been disabused of even this hope. For in hidden variable theories, the 
determinist stance does indeed seem to have been lost, even at the level of its 
epistemological fecundity. The determinist stance was only fruitful because it 
compelled researchers to conceive of networks of univocal bonds underlying 
phenomena, to design the type of experiment that would allow these bonds to be 
brought to light, and to thus define often unprecedented classes of phenomena. 
Unfortunately, this process is blocked from the outset by the in-principle 
inaccessibility of the bonds that underlie phenomena in contextualist hidden variable 
theories capable of reproducing quantum predictions. Once the reciprocal current of 
information between the determinist project and the definition of new domains of 
experimentation dries up, the attempt to pursue this project formally becomes nothing 
more than a jeu d’esprit whose principal (if not sole) interest is its serving as an 
intellectual stimulant for specialists in the foundations of modern physics. 
This situation does not justify, for all that, the inverse excess—namely, 
indeterminist dogmatism. All one is within one’s rights to observe is that henceforth, 
in the physical sciences, the advantage of epistemological fruitfulness will belong to 
the stance that consists in maximally developing predictive capacity to the detriment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  But,	   it	  will	  be	  asked,	  are	  there	  not	  also	  difficulties	   in	  adapting	  standard	  quantum	  theories	  to	  relativistic	  theories,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   advances	   realised	   by	  Dirac	   and	   the	   creators	   of	   quantum	   field	   theory?	  Doubtless.	  However,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  remarks	  made	  in	  the	  preceding	  note,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  these	  difficulties	  are	  
not	  of	   the	   same	  nature	   as	   those	  met	  with	   by	   hidden	   variable	   theories.	   Hidden	   variable	   theories	   confront	  relativistic	   theories	   on	   their	   own	   terrain—that	   of	   the	   description	   of	   spatiotemporal	   events	   that	   can	   be	  treated	   as	   if	   they	   occurred	   of	   themselves.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   standard	   quantum	   theories	   operate	   on	   a	  completely	   different	   plane:	   that	   of	   the	   prediction	   of	   phenomena	   whose	   production	   is	   suspended	   in	   the	  presence	   of	   appropriate	   contexts	   that	   are	   sometimes	  mutually	   incompatible.	   The	   problem	   of	   the	   putting	  into	  concordance	  of	  standard	  quantum	  theories	  and	  relativistic	  physics	  thus	  very	  probably	  pertains	  to	  the	  difficulty	   in	  defining	  an	  appropriate	  terrain	  upon	  which	  the	  two	  theoretical	  universes	  can	  encounter	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  direct	  conflict.	  18	  On	   this	   subject,	   see	   Jacques	   Harthong’s	   ‘fifth	   conflict	   of	   transcendental	   ideas’,	   cited	   by	   A.	   Dahan-­‐Dalmedico	   in	   A.	   Dahan-­‐Dalmedico,	   J.L.	   Chabert	   and	   K.	   Chemla	   (eds.),	   Chaos	   et	   déterminisme	   (Paris:Seuil,	  1992),	  405;	  and	  J.	  Harthong,	  Probabilités	  et	  statistiques	  (Paris:	  Diderot,	  1996).	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of descriptive ambition, the calculus of probabilities rather than determinist models of 
evolution. 
It is true that many thinkers do not stop there; they tend to extrapolate the 
epistemological observation of the fecundity of the indeterminist option into an 
ontological affirmation of the intrinsically stochastic character of the laws governing 
the world. But their position is easily acceptable on the methodological plane, without 
it being necessary to follow them in the metaphysical aspects of their conclusions. As 
James Logue has shown in his Projective Probability,19 every coherent system of 
probabilistic evaluation can be interpreted in realist fashion—that is to say, it can be 
understood as expressing propositions whose truth status is independent of the means 
of testing them. And this interpretation in turn might lead the authors of a 
probabilistic evaluation to project it onto the world. We should not be surprised, in 
these circumstances, that quantum physics’ coherent system of probabilistic 
evaluations, without the counterbalance of a fruitful determinist programme, could 
have been conceived by researchers as eminent as Popper (and even Heisenberg, in 
his own way) as translating, in part or as a whole, a ‘real’ or ‘existent’ characteristic 
of the world.20 Popper, for example, holds that the world is made of capacities, of 
potentialities or of natural propensities, which manifest themselves experimentally 
through particular statistical distributions of phenomena, and which are reflected in 
quantum theory in the form of a probabilistic algorithm. 
Incontestably, the partisans of an ontological indeterminism thereby deliver 
themselves, just as much as the defenders of hidden variable theories, to what Kant 
would have denounced as an attempt to extend the application of our concepts beyond 
the limits of experience21—the sole advantage accruing to the partisans of hidden 
variable theories being that they limit themselves to directly hypostasizing the 
quantum formalism’s mode of operation, rather than seeking to develop a new one. 
But ought we to reproach them for this? Since every coherent system of probabilistic 
evaluation can be read in a realist mode, since nothing prevents the interpretation of 
the quantum algorithm of probability calculus as translating an order of natural 
propensities, why would we prohibit them from adhering unhesitatingly to such 
interpretations? Why would we refuse their belief, without ulterior motive, that 
quantum theory describes a reality made of pure potentialities? 
The type of response we shall try to give to this question is of an 
epistemological rather than metaphysical order. We shall not ask if reality is or is not 
made of potentialities that have the structure of the probabilistic algorithm of quantum 
theory, but only whether or not we lose anything on the plane of understanding if we 
interpret this algorithm in realist fashion. 
Let us say right away—and this is the meaning of James Logue’s statement of 
equivalence—that neither the practitioner of probabilistic evaluation nor the quantum 
physicist lose anything whatsoever to such a way of seeing things. They may even 
gain something that is at the heart of every profession of realist faith—namely, the 
seriousness with which they consider their theoretical entities, and the motivation for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  J.	  Logue,	  Projective	  probability	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  20	  K.	  Popper,	  A	  Universe	  of	  Propensities	  (Bristol:	  Thoemmes,	  1992).	  21	  This	   accusation	   is	   addressed	   to	   someone	  who	   takes	  Popper’s	  declarations	  on	  propensity	  more	   literally	  than	   Popper	   himself.	   For	   Popper	   recognised	   that	   the	   metaphysical	   question	   of	   determinism	   remains	  undecidable	  before,	  just	  as	  after,	  quantum	  mechanics.	  He	  considered	  simply	  that	  only	  the	  abandonment	  of	  dogmatic	   determinism	   could	   open	   the	  way	   to	   nonconventional	   theories	   of	   change	   that	  may	   prove	  more	  fruitful	   than	   the	   causal	   and	   spatiokinematic	   theories	   inherited	   from	   the	   first	   scientific	   revolution	   of	   the	  seventeenth	   century.	  One	  of	   these	   alternative	   theories	   is	  no	  other	   than	   the	   theory	  of	  propensions.	   See	  K.	  Popper,	  The	  Open	  Universe	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1988),	  Chapter	  4.	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research.22 On the other hand, the philosopher really does have something to lose in 
allowing himself to be fascinated by the sole relation between theory and world. For 
this stance does not at all incite him to reflect upon what the theory owes to the 
situation of man in the world, and in particular what it owes to the very practice of 
experimental investigation. Unlike the scientist in his everyday work, the philosopher 
cannot content himself with occupying the Pascalian situation of the man in the milieu 
that he explores; he must think this situation, and charge himself with enunciating its 
consequences. The scientific researcher, moreover, also has an interest in adopting the 
reflexive stance from time to time, when she arrives at periods of reorientation in her 
work. And everyone knows that she finds herself almost inevitably led to do so when 
science is going through revolutionary times. 
 
A Generalised Theory of Probability 
 
It is this type of reorientation that we shall now proceed to undertake. We are 
going to suspend judgment on the subject of a hypothetical partial isomorphism 
between quantum mechanics and the real in which we experiment, and interest 
ourselves selectively in what the structure of this theory owes to the form of 
experimental activity itself. 
Let us begin by rapidly recounting, to this end, the architecture of standard 
quantum mechanics: 
1. The formal kernel of this theory consists in a vector space defined on the set 
of complex numbers, and endowed with a scalar product; in other words, Hilbert 
space. 
2. Upon this space are defined specific operators, called ‘observables’, which 
furnish, through their eigenvalues, the list of possible results of an operation of 
measurement. 
3. A vector in Hilbert space, called a state vector, is associated with each 
preparation (that is to say, with that which, in an experiment, fixes the conditions 
necessary for measurement). 
4. By applying Born’s Rule to this state vector, we obtain a function assigning 
probabilities to the results of any measurement whatsoever that is made subsequent to 
this preparation. 
5. As variable spatiotemporal intervals and diverse physical circumstances can 
separate the end of the functioning of the preparation and the operation of 
measurement, we take account of them by way of an evolution equation of the state 
vectors: Schrödinger’s equation in the non-relativistic case, Dirac’s in the relativist 
case. 
Here I would like to insist upon the major difference between the probability 
functions in the classical theory of probabilities and those that are obtained on the 
basis of the state vectors of quantum mechanics by applying Born’s Rule. Classical 
probability functions associate a number between 0 and 1 with each ‘event’ in the 
broad sense, defined by Kolmogorov23 as a subset of elementary events. The set of 
these subset-events comprises the empty set and the exhaustive set, and it is endowed 
with a Boolean algebra structure by the operations of union and intersection. In other 
words, classical probability functions are defined upon a Boolean algebra. On the 
contrary, taking account of the properties of Hilbert space, quantum probability 
functions are not defined upon a Boolean algebra; they are defined upon different and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  M.	  Bitbol,	  Schrödinger’s	  Philosophy	  of	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  1996),	  paragraphs	  5-­‐9.	  23	  A.	  Kolmogorov,	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Probability	  (New	  York:	  Chelsea,	  1950).	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richer structures called ‘orthoalgebras’. 24  I will avoid detailing the axioms of 
orthoalgebra, and content myself with indicating that the concept of orthoalgebra is 
not unrelated to Boolean algebra. One might even consider that orthoalgebras 
constitute a generalisation of Boolean algebras, and that, correlatively, quantum 
probability functions generalise classical probability functions. For an orthoalgebra 
contains Boolean algebras as its substructures; and, on the other hand, the restriction 
of a quantum probability function to these Boolean substructures is equivalent to a 
classical probability function. 
This structural disparity between classical and quantum probability functions 
justifies our refusing to content ourselves with the observation that quantum 
mechanics ‘uses’ probability theory. Quantum mechanics itself consists, in part, in a 
new and broadened form of probability theory. 
 
A Metacontextual Predictive Formalism 
 
It would, however, be a shame to limit ourselves to this superficial and 
formalist exposition of the situation. We can easily enough understand the reasons for 
the emergence of a new sort of theory of probability by showing that it is a practically 
inevitable response to the characteristics of the class of experimental phenomena that 
quantum mechanics deals with. Principal among these characteristics, as already 
pointed out in our reflections on the concept of secondary qualities, is contextuality; 
in other words, the inseparability of the phenomena and the experimental context of 
its manifestation. It is this that imposes a great many of the structural characteristics 
of quantum theory. 
But to really bring to light the very strong link between contextuality and 
quantum mechanics, we must firstly analyse what makes the contextuality of quantum 
phenomena uncircumventable, and differentiate it from other, more benign and easily 
surmountable forms of the relation of determinations to a context. 
In all sciences, as in many ordinary situations, we can say that to each 
experimental or sensory situation there corresponds a whole gamut of possible 
phenomena or determinations. For example, to a context represented by the cones of 
the retina there corresponds a scale of colours, to a context represented by a ruler 
corresponds a scale of lengths, to a context represented by a thermometer corresponds 
a scale of temperatures, and so on. But as long as the contexts can be conjoined, or as 
long as the determinations are indifferent to the order of intervention of contexts, 
nothing prevents our fusing the scales of possibilities into one sole scale relative to 
one sole global context, and then passing over this context in silence and treating the 
elements of the scale as if they translated so many intrinsic determinations. The 
presupposition that nothing prevents us from retracting the context is automatic when 
one makes use of the propositions of ordinary language: for the latter allow us to 
attribute many determinations to the same object as if they belonged to it. It is 
important to note that this presupposition and this mode of functioning of language 
are associated with a classical, boolean logic and a classical, Kolmogorovian, theory 
of probabilities. 
But the appearance of obstacles to the conjunction of contexts, or the 
observing of an lack of independence of phenomena vis-à-vis the order of utilisation 
of contexts, as is the case in microscopic physics when one tries to measure 
canonically conjugated variables, renders traditional methods useless. The strategy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 	  R.I.G.	   Hughes,	   The	   Structure	   and	   Interpretation	   of	   Quantum	   Mechanics	   (Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  220.	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not taking account of the experimental context fails, and it becomes imperative to 
make explicit the contextuality of determinations. 
In this situation that confronts quantum physics, boolean logic and 
kolmogorovian probability, at first glance, only survive fragmented into many 
sublogics and many probabilistic structures, each of them associated with a particular 
context. To each experimental context is associated a scale of possible determinations 
and a scale of attributive propositions which belong to a classical, boolean, sublogic; 
and to each determination chosen from the set of possible determinations 
corresponding to a given context, can be attached a real number that obeys 
Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability. But these sublogics and these probabilistic 
substructures cannot be fused together, for they depend on distinct contexts that 
cannot, in general, be conjoined. Under such conditions, we seek to articulate them 
with each other, respectively in the framework of a metalogic and a metacontextual 
probabilistic formalism. What is remarkable is that when one constructs such a 
metalogic, in taking account only of the impossibility of conjoining the diverse scales 
of possibles, one arrives at structures isomorphic with the celebrated nondistributive 
‘quantum logic’ of de Birkhoff and von Neumann.25 And what is more, when one 
tries to construct a metacontextual probabilistic formalism, in constraining oneself 
only to respect Kolmogorov’s axioms separately for each scale of possibilities, and 
utilising one unique generative symbol of subfunctions of probabilities for each 
preparation, one arrives at a class of structures whose vector formalism in Hilbert 
spaces of quantum mechanics is hardly a peculiar case. The form of the evolution 
equation of quantum mechanics is itself derivable from the general conditions bearing 
upon the temporal stability of the status of the tool of probabilistic evaluation of the 
state vector.26 
In its function as a theory-framework, quantum mechanics is consequently 
nothing less than a metacontextual form of probability theory. It brings together the 
conditions of possibility of a unified system of probabilistic prediction bearing upon 
phenomena inseparable from sometimes incompatible contexts. It only remains to 
complete this theory-framework with various symmetries27 in order to draw from it 
various particular varieties of quantum theory. 
 
Decoherence and Probabilities 
 
We have seen that, short of confronting the grave epistemological difficulties 
of nonlocal hidden variable theories, quantum probabilities cannot be taken as the 
expression of an ignorance on the subject of processes or events that happen of 
themselves within nature. The quantum calculus of probabilities bears upon 
phenomena whose occurrence is suspended by the intervention of an appropriate 
context. The problem is that, qua physical theory, quantum mechanics has a vocation 
to universality. The metacontextual probability calculus which is its principal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  P.	  Heelan,	  ‘Complementarity,	  Context-­‐Dependence,	  and	  Quantum	  Logic’,	  Found.	  Phys.	  1	  (1970),	  95-­‐110.	  26 	  Bitbol,	   Mécanique	   quantique,	   une	   introduction	   philosophique;	   M.	   Bitbol,	   ‘Towards	   a	   transcendental	  deduction	   of	   quantum	   mechanics’,	   5th	   UK	   conference	   on	   the	   conceptual	   problems	   of	   modern	   physics,	  Oxford,	  September	  1996.	  The	  essential	  theorems	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  arrive	  at	  these	  conclusions	  are	  due	  to	  J.L.	  Destouches,	  P.	  Destouches-­‐Février,	  G.	  Fano,	  A.M.	  Gleason,	  et	  J.	  Bub.	  See	  P.	  Destouches-­‐Février,	  La	  structure	  
des	   théories	  physiques	  (Paris:	   PUF,	   1951),	   and	  R.I.G.	   Hughes,	  The	  Structure	  and	   Interpretation	  of	  Quantum	  
Mechanics	  (on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  theorems	  of	  Fano,	  Gleason	  and	  Bub).	  27	  ‘Quantum	  mechanics	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  dynamical	  theory.	  It	  is	  an	  empty	  stage.	  You	  have	  to	  add	  the	  actors	  […]	  the	  missing	   element	   that	   has	   to	   be	   added	   to	   quantum	  mechanics	   is	   a	   principle,	   or	   several	   principles,	   of	  symmetry.’	   S.	   Weinberg,	   in	   R.P.	   Feynman	   &	   S.	   Weinberg,	   Elementary	   Particles	   and	   the	   Laws	   of	   Physics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  87.	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constitutive element must therefore be able to be applied without restriction and on 
every scale. But, in our familiar environment, isn’t the classical (Kolmogorovian) 
theory of probabilities perfectly utilisable? And doesn’t this classical theory, unlike its 
quantum equivalent, function such that nothing prohibits us from considering it as 
expressing a partial ignorance as to intrinsic properties and autonomous events? Thus 
is posed a problem of compatibility, between quantum probability calculus (valid in 
principle on every scale) and the classical calculus of probabilities (valid in practice 
on our scale). 
The principal objective of theories of decoherence is to test this compatibility. 
For they allow us to prove that, when applied to complex processes involving an 
object, a measuring apparatus, and a vast environment, quantum probability calculus 
is reduced, up to a very weak approximation, to the classical calculus of probabilities. 
This is manifest in the quasi-disappearance of the terms of interference typical of 
quantum probability calculus, and isomorphic to those of a wave process, in favour of 
a quasi-validity of the classical rule of the additivity of probabilities of a disjunction. 
However, rare are those physicists who are content with this purely 
probabilistic and predictive formulation of theories of decoherence. Some among 
them have even cherished the hope of utilising decoherence as a means of explaining 
the emergence of a classical world, on the basis of a quantum world supposedly 
‘described’ by a universal state vector.28 The major obstacle they find themselves up 
against is that, in order to be able to derive, on the basis of a purely quantum 
calculation, the classical laws and behaviours that prevail at the human scale, they 
have not been able to avoid introducing hypotheses that already contain 
anthropomorphic elements.29 
These discomfitures encourage us to demand no more from decoherence 
theories than a retrospective assurance of a coherence that is in practice sufficient 
between quantum probability calculus and the presupposition, at once fundamental 
and elementary, that subtends its experimental testimony. This presupposition consists 
in admitting that macroscopic events (like the deviation of the indicator of an 
apparatus) themselves arise in the laboratory, that their trace is for all time available 
for any researcher who desires to repeat the observation, and that the utilisation of 
probability calculus with regard to them, consequently, only expresses a partial 
ignorance as to what they are. 
 
Quantum Field Theory, Path Integrals, and Metacontextual Predictive 
Formalism 
 
The reflections above, it is true, hold something surprising for certain 
contemporary physicists. For, in manipulating a concept of field sometimes 
insufficiently distinguished from its classical equivalent, and in taking literally the 
processes that are figured imagistically in Feynman diagrams, a non-negligible 
number among them ended up behaving as though the conceptual problems that 
quantum mechanics raised at its birth were but a bad memory. If physics ‘describes’ 
the evolution of fundamental fields, and/or if manages to ‘describe’, equally, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  M.	   Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar. Adventures in the Simple and the Complex (New York: 
Abacus, 1995).	  29	  Bitbol,	  Mécanique	  quantique,	  une	  introduction	  philosophique,	  410-­‐18.	  For	  a	  close	  critique	  of	  the	  ontological	  claims	  of	  theories	  of	  decoherence,	  see	  B.	  d’Espagnat,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Separable	  Empirical	  Reality’,	  Foundations	  of	  
Physics	  20	  (1990),	  1147-­‐72.	  R.	  Omnès’s	  response	  can	  be	  found	  in	  R.	  Omnès,	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Quantum	  
Mechanics	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994). 
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dynamics of particles (considered as a state of excitation of a field) by way of the 
procedure of Feynman path integrals, why still preoccupy oneself with that old 
Bohrian notion of the inseparability of the phenomena and its experimental conditions 
of manifestation? Why bring to the fore a notion as opaque for the theoretical 
physicist as that of ‘measurement’?30 Why insist obstinately upon the predictive rather 
than descriptive status of quantum theories? Isn’t it possible that many of the 
philosophical perplexities of the creators of quantum mechanics were linked to the 
use of a formalism (that of vectors in Hilbert space) which, in the most advanced 
theories, has been rendered obsolete by the formalism of path integrals? 
The response to these questions is that, in truth, none of the epistemological 
constraints exerted by the standard quantum mechanics of 1926 have been relaxed by 
contemporary varieties of quantum theory, and that new constraints of a similar order 
have even been added to them. Whatever representations they may give rise to, 
current quantum theories always operate as generalised, metacontextual instruments 
of probabilistic prediction. And this stems from the fact that they are always 
confronted with phenomena inseparable from their context of manifestation. So as to 
shore up this response, it will be sufficient to evoke rapidly the renovation of 
philosophical reflections invited by quantum field theory, and then to redefine the 
relations between the formalism of state vectors in Hilbert space and that of Feynman 
path integrals. 
The central trait of quantum theories, which is that they consist in a 
metacontextual structure of probabilistic prediction, is rediscovered, not only intact 
but amplified, in quantum field theory. At the end of a reflection on the formalisms of 
Fock spaces, Paul Teller concludes: ‘states [in Fock space] simply characterise 
propensities for what will be manifested with what probability under various 
activating conditions. Among the items for which there can be propensities for 
manifestation is the occurrence of various numbers of quanta…’31 In other words, far 
from having rendered superfluous contextual notions such as those of propensive 
state, ‘observable’, and conditions of ‘activation’, quantum field theories have 
generalised their application. The concept of quantum field is derived from the 
classical concept of the field by putting local observables into correspondence with 
local functions, and through the introduction of relations of commutation (or anti-
commutation) for certain couples of observables. As to state vectors in Fock space, 
they allow not only the calculation of the probability that this or that ‘property’ of a 
particle will manifest itself in a given experimental context, but the probability that a 
certain number of particles will be detected under the appropriate instrumental 
conditions. This number itself is treated as an observable, the set of whose possible 
values under appropriate conditions of detection is identified with the set of whole 
natural numbers. To the contextualisation of the predicate of objects typical of 
standard quantum mechanics, then, quantum field theory adds the contextualisation of 
the notion of the denumerable substrates of predicates. 
That one must from now on hold the very concept of ‘particles’, and not only 
that of ‘properties of a particle’, to be relative to a context of manifestation, is 
rendered particularly evident by the relativistic phenomenon of so-called ‘Rindler 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Let	  us	  remark	  in	  passing	  that,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘measurement’	  cannot	  claim	  any	  particular	  status	  within	  the	  field	  of	  validity	  of	  physical	  theories	  (since	  it	  is	  not	  distinct	  in	  principle	  from	  other	  physical	  processes),	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  conceptual	  resources	  of	  a	  background	  that	  is	  logically	  prior	  to	  any	  experimental,	  
testable	  theoretical	  elaboration.	  It	  thus	  has	  an	  uncircumventable	  metatheoretical	  function.	  31	  P.	  Teller,	  An	  Interpretive	  Introduction	  to	  Quantum	  Field	  Theory	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  105.	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particles’. This phenomenon is observed when accelerating a detector in the ‘void’.32 
The accelerated detector responds, in this environment where no detector at rest 
would detect the least particle, as if it were plunged into a thermic bath of particles.33 
It is thus quite clear that one cannot treat particles as objects that ‘are’ there or ‘are 
not’ there, independently of the conditions of their detection. One has only the right to 
speak of phenomena of detection that imply, indissociably, a milieu (say ‘the quantum 
void’), a detector, and the dynamic state of this detector. Quantum field theories now 
appear as particular elaborations of the metacontextual probabilistic framework of 
quantum mechanics—elaborations adapted to a broadened class of contextual 
phenomena, belonging to a relativistic domain, and pertaining to the formal concept 
of ‘support’, beyond that of ‘property’.34 
Now we come to Feynman path integral formalisms, which have often 
supplanted standard formalisms in the modern practice of quantum field theories.35 
Although the functioning of path integrals is illustrated by linear diagrams evoking 
spatiotemporal trajectories of particles, their role is only to permit the calculation of 
the probability of a final experimental event (at a certain point) under condition of the 
occurrence of an initial experimental event (at another point). Here, the dependence of 
the phenomena whose probability is calculated on an instrumental context is only 
implicit, but it plays a no less capital role in the very principle of the calculation to be 
carried out. For what does one concretely do when one evaluates a path integral? One 
sums ‘probability amplitudes’, then one takes the square of the modulus of the sum 
thus obtained, to obtain the probability one seeks.36 Now, the distinction between 
probability amplitudes and probabilities corresponds pretty much to that between 
virtual experiments and actual experiments. Read in the framework of standard 
formalism, probability amplitude is nothing other than the scalar product of the state 
vector and of a vector belonging to an observable corresponding to an experiment that 
would have taken place (but which did not) in the interval that separates the two 
actual experiments.37 On the contrary, probability is calculated for the result of an 
experiment that will actually take place, or which already has done. The path integral 
formalism, just like that of Hilbert space vectors, manifests the metacontextual 
predictive structure of quantum theories. It consists in evaluating the probability of a 
contextual phenomenon by summing the terms corresponding to virtual intermediary 
contexts distinct from those in which the phenomenon is effectively manifest. 
Let us add to this two other circumstances that suggest close relations between 
the functioning of quantum theories utilising a vector formalism in Hilbert space, and 
those making use of path integrals: Firstly, Feynman has demonstrated the 
equivalence between the formalism of standard quantum mechanics, which puts a 
Hamiltonian operator in place in Schrodinger’s equation, and the path integral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	   formal	   translation	  of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   ‘quantum	  void’	   is	   a	   state	   vector	   in	   Fock	   space	   identical	   to	  those	  of	  vectors	  belonging	   to	   the	  observable	   ‘Number’	   that	   is	  associated	  with	   the	  proper	  value	  Zero.	  This	  state	  vector	  associates	  a	  null	  probability	  with	  the	  detection	  of	  a	  number	  of	  particles	   larger	  than	  zero	  by	  a	  detector	  at	  rest.	  33	  Teller,	  An	  interpretive	  introduction,	  110.	  34	  The	  link	  between	  the	  intervention	  of	  relativistic	  processes	  and	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘support’	  alongside	   that	  of	   ‘property’	   is	  made	   immediately	  comprehensible	  by	  a	  clarifying	  remark	  of	  B.	  d’Espagnat:	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  energy-­‐mass	  equivalence	  established	  by	  the	  Theory	  of	  Special	  Relativity,	  d’Espagnat	  remarks	   (in	  Le	  réel	  voilé	   [Paris:	   Fayard,	   1994]),	   it	   can	   always	  happen	   that	   a	   ‘property	  of	   objects’	   (kinetic	  energy)	  is	  transformed	  into	  ‘objects’	  (one	  or	  several	  particles).	  35	  In	   superstring	   theory,	   the	   linear	  pathways	   are	   replaced	  by	   tubes,	   and	   the	   summation	   effectuated	  by	   an	  integral	  bears	  upon	  these	  tubes	  of	  spacetime	  whose	  section	  is	  an	  annular	  ‘string’.	  36	  R.P.	  Feynman	  &	  A.R.	  Hibbs,	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  and	  Path	  Integrals	  (New	  York:	  McGraw	  Hill,	  1965);	  R.P.	  Feynman,	  QED:	  The	  Strange	  Theory	  of	  Light	  and	  Matter	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1988).	  37	  Generally,	  these	  experiments	  consist	  in	  making	  (virtual	  or	  actual)	  measurements	  of	  the	  spatial	  position.	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formalism, which uses the corresponding Lagrangian function.38 What is more, just as 
certain principles of symmetry determine the Hamiltonian form of Schrodinger’s 
equation, it is the principles of symmetry that allow us to fix the density of the 
Lagrangian of each interaction, and thus to determine the path integral.39 The use of 
such principles of symmetry has as its most concrete consequence the modulation of 
path integrals (and consequently also that of the probabilistic evaulations that result 
from them), annulling the amplitude of certain of the diagrams that intervene in the 
summation.40 
 
Epilogue 
 
All of this leads us to conclude with two propositions that are valid 
independently of the variety of quantum theory or formalism utilised: Every quantum 
theory combines an invariable element—a metacontextual form of probability 
theory—and a variable element—a set of symmetries. The association of these two 
elements makes it a system of probabilistic evaluation suitable for a class of 
experimental situations whose extension depends upon the symmetries brought into 
play. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Feynman	  &	  Hibbs,	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  and	  Path	  Integrals,	  Chapter	  4.	  39	  G.	  Cohen-­‐Tannoudji	  &	  M.	  Spiro,	  La	  matière-­‐espace-­‐temps	  (Paris:	  Gallimard,	  1990),	  185.	  40	  S.	  Weinberg,	  The	  Quantum	  Theory	  of	  Fields	  I	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  428.	  	  
